While the focus isn't really on the free will aspect, it seems to parse to some connection to it. The soul seems to matter as a source of agency, with attendant uniqueness from the history of choices and their impact.
Tacky's sentiments seem to parallel Sam Harris' on the matter, of which I largely sympathize with. But that's somewhat of an idealist approach. I can see Daniel Dennet's approach with compatibilism.
There are pitfalls in both paths. With compatibilism, there's the room for obfuscation and mystifying of terms, and misleading or misunderstanding. With reductionism, the danger lies in categorization and marginalization, along with ostracization. There have been historical regimes, I think, with both "sins" on their record for distorting their intent and taking advantage to exploit these ideologies. Think Crusades, think Communism, think Fascism, think so many different things.
To get on a path of compassion due to a more "realistic" view, or one consistent with scientific consensus, because I think there's merit to the scientific endeavor to self-correct and review, it might take those bridges which Tacky states as risky for delusion or misdirection. I think those are milder than the alternative, right now. But that can change. I think language and definition (and meaning, therefore) matter here.
In a key sense, common psychology might have trouble in a reductionist, nihilist-adjacent view. I think most people will be prone to a very depressive, negative view when presented with what is even logically consistent and scientifically "proven". (Again, a certain kind of narrative, no matter how close to what we believe to truth, is still a certain way of describing something, fraught with bias and consensus.)
In particular, the difficulty I think people have between determinism and fatalism.
And...
(I may have used "seem" too much.)