Link below, Here are the excellent questions on the origin of the CHINA Virus
Essential Questions
Because the first phase of the joint study process focused primarily on examining the
zoonosis hypothesis, commensurate efforts should now be expended in the next phase of
the study examining the possibility of a lab-related incident, including by addressing the
following questions:
1.
In April 2012, after clearing bat guano in an abandoned mine in Mojiang (Yunnan), six
men contracted severe pneumonia with COVID-19-like symptoms. All were sent to
Kunming hospital where three eventually died. An on-duty doctor at the hospital at the
time reported a ‘potential epidemic outbreak’ of unknown pneumonia to the local
Center for Disease Control, on arrival of the 5 th patient. Unspecified samples from
these patients were sent to the Wuhan Institute of Virology and other labs in 2012. Dr.
Shi Zhengli recently announced that the WIV tested the serum samples again.
Why were these six miners sent to clean guano in the mine in April 2012? Who
hired them and sent them all to the same distant Kunming hospital?
Why are these pneumonia cases absent from the Chinese CDC statistics for
2012 and why were they not reported to the WHO, despite a ‘potential epidemic
outbreak’ alert having been reported to the local CDC?
Why were these lethal pneumonia cases not mentioned in any scientific
research article after 2014, despite the PREDICT program showing a high
interest for potential coronavirus disease outbreaks via bat guano shortly after
these events?
Were any SARS-like coronaviruses isolated from the patient samples?
What samples were taken from these six patients and sent to the WIV and other
labs? Are any of these samples available for independent analysis?
Is it possible to interview the three surviving miners, their relatives and some
Mojiang villagers - and also to take serum samples from them - in order to better
understand in which condition these miners fell sick and what their exact
pathology was?
2.
To this day all the coronaviruses most closely related to SARS-CoV-2 come from that
Mojiang mine. Some scientists who went sampling at the mine had their samples
confiscated while investigative journalists have been systematically turned away.
Can Chinese authorities offer unfettered access to the mine to international
scientists for the required continued sampling effort?
3.
Animal sampling and testing is the only way to establish a zoonotic origin, be it in the
wild or in a farm. This data should be shared with the international scientific
community.
Which animals were, are and will be tested in China, in which wild ecosystems
and in which breeding farms?
Can the full data for these tests be shared with international experts and the
scientific community?
4.
Chinese authorities have asserted difficulties sharing human health data with the
international members of the WHO-China joint team because of strict domestic
privacy laws. However informed consent can normally be waived when de-identified
data is used, as was done for instance in this recent Chinese publication involving
35,040 Wuhan citizens tested for COVID-19.
Why was such a waiver not available when requests for very similar data were
made by the joint-mission team members?
Can this type of waiver be made now?
5.
Dr. Shi Zhengli has stated that Wuhan Institute of Virology virus databases were taken
offline during the pandemic. However the key bat virus database was taken offline in
September 2019, three months before the official start of the outbreak.
Can Chinese officials explain this contradiction?
Can Chinese officials explain why the scientific paper describing the key
database (digital object identifier: 10.11922/csdata.2019.0018.zh) was taken
offline from the corresponding Chinese journal website “China Science Data” in
mid-2020?
Can Chinese officials also explain why the full website of “China Science Data”,
where the database was described, became inaccessible in March-April 2021?
Can these databases, in their form as of September 2019, be shared with the
WHO study group?
6.
A bat coronavirus sampled in the Mojiang mine in 2013 (‘RaTG13’) is still the virus
most closely-related to SARS-CoV-2. Dr. Shi Zhengli and Yanyi Wang, director of the
WIV, said in interviews that there is “no more sample” of RaTG13, so that no further
sequencing is possible, and that the virus was no longer “in our lab.” Based on the
raw data provided, it has unfortunately not been possible to assemble the RaTG13
genome sequence.
When was the RaTG13 sample fully depleted?
How was the RaTG13 genome sequence assembled and how was the 5’ end
sequence determined?
Did the WIV or any other laboratory ever attempt to recreate RaTG13 or any
other coronaviruses by assembling them from synthetic gene sequences?
Why are a few of the RaTG13 amplicons dated as June 2017 and named
“7896”, which is the name of another closely related virus collected in the same
mine?
Given that RaTG13 shows weak binding to bat receptor ACE-2 and binds only
to one of the ACE2 orthologs of Rhinolophus affinis, is RaTG13 the true whole
genome sequence of the sample BtCoV/4991 collected in 2013 by the WIV?
7.
A striking feature of the SARS-CoV-2 genome which increases its pathogenicity, is the
presence of a so-called “furin cleavage site”. This site was noted as a “cleavage site”
in a January 2020 publication by Dr. Shi Zheng-Li and colleagues.
Why was this so-called “furin cleavage site,” clearly an important and novel
feature of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, not mentioned in the February 2020 Nature
publication?
8.
WIV acknowledged isolating three strains of live SARS-related coronaviruses, but
based on the WIV naming convention for their live viruses isolates it appears that the
WIV did not disclose two potential isolates, WIV6 (not WIV06) and WIV15, as these
names are not mentioned anywhere in the literature.
Do these isolates exist? If no, what is the explanation for why these isolate
names were skipped in the series?
In any case, can the sequences, additional relevant data and the live isolates
themselves for all viruses?, plus their clones and mutants (if any) be provided to
the WHO Study Group?
9.
WIV laboratories were involved in specific government-sponsored research projects in
2019, in collaboration with EcoHealth Alliance. The key objective for one of these
projects (‘bat coronavirus surveillance’) was to identify potentially dangerous viruses
based on their spike proteins and involved so-called “gain of functions” experiments,
in which viruses were specifically manipulated to acquire new pathogenic features.
Can Chinese authorities provide the laboratory notebooks and electronic
records of the WIV and of any other laboratory that was involved in virus “gain
of function” research, as well as any results, including related sequences and
isolates?
Can Peter Daszak, President of EcoHealth Alliance and also a member of the
joint study team, clarify the context of the experiments he was referring to in late
2019 and make all relevant records available to the study team?
10. The influenza diagnosis and treatment plan issued by China's National Health
Commission on 13 November 2019 advised against isolating virus specimens from
patients who did not test positive for influenza, while the 2018 plan had previously
encouraged it. This change in policy may have had the unfortunate consequence of
facilitating an unreported circulation of SARS-CoV-2 in the last few weeks of 2019.
What was the reason for this change in policy?
11. Chinese authorities have stated that staff at four Wuhan labs all tested negative for
SARS-CoV-2 antibodies.
How many people were tested, in which Wuhan labs, on which days, and as
part of which teams or services within these labs?
Were any of these serum samples retained?
Are independent international investigators able to retest the samples of the lab
staff to confirm the results?
12. Dr. Shi Zhengli and Dr. Yuan Zhiming have both stated that ‘all staff tested negative
for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies’ at the WIV in March 2020. Yet, this is statistically unlikely
(roughly less than one chance in a billion) given that there are more than 590 staff and
students at the WIV and about 4.4% of the Wuhan urban population tested positive at
around that time. Even if only 85 people were tested, the chance of no positive test
would still be less than 4%.
How can this contradiction be explained?
Can Chinese authorities make available the anonymized raw data of these tests
and the test samples for further examination?